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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the educational background of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) from large 
U.S. firms. Forbes CEO compensation lists and Compustat data covering 500 or more firms 
annually are utilized in the analysis for the period 1997-2006.  Universities are ranked based on 
the number of graduates placed in top CEO positions and of the total compensation their 
graduates earn as CEO.  Results show a select group of schools educate a large proportion of top 
CEOs.  Harvard dominates the CEO market at all educational levels.  Results show low 
correlation between university placement rankings and compensation rankings.  Regressions on 
CEO compensation provide additional insights into CEO compensation determinants. Regressions 
of CEO educational variables on firm performance measures identify links between CEO 
education and firm performance.  This is the first known paper to examine CEO gender as a 
determinant of compensation and firm performance.  The evidence here provides hiring and 
compensation committees valuable information on appropriate hiring, retention and 
compensation strategies.  It also provides government officials additional insights for designing 
appropriate regulations. 
 
Keywords:  CEO Compensation; CEO Education; CEO Gender; Firm Performance 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
EO compensation and its relationship to firm performance has been examined in conjunction with the 
literature of several disciplines.  This paper extends the analysis by examining educational backgrounds 
of CEO’s from large U.S. companies.  Specifically, this research examines educational backgrounds of 
CEO’s from the largest U.S. firms over a ten-year time period from 1997-2006.  A variety of studies document links 
between educational background and individual characteristics. Dollinger (1984) identified a relationship between 
education and tolerance for ambiguity.  Other researchers have identified relationships between educational level, 
the rate of corporate innovation and the likelihood of strategic change (Bantel and Jackson, 1989 and Wiersemana 
and Bantel, 1992).  Hambrick and Masson (1984) argued that advanced education both indicates and encourages a 
preference for administrative complexity.  Still others have suggested that educational background provides a basis 
for psychological group identification that can create the perception of similarity regardless of any actual behavioral 
similarities (Tsui, Egan and O’Reilly, 1992). 
 
Despite a large body of evidence that links educational background to a variety of attitudes and  managerial 
behaviors, a relatively small body of literature examines educational background as it relates to CEO performance.  
Even fewer studies use large datasets to test their contentions.  Jalbert Rao and Jalbert (2002) examine Forbes CEO 
compensation data from 1987-1996 including a dataset of some 8,000 observations.  They rank universities based on 
the number of degrees awarded to large-firm CEO’s and found that a select group of universities are primarily 
responsible for educating large-firm CEOs.  Princeton is identified as the largest provider of undergraduate degrees 
while Harvard far-and-away the largest provider of graduate degrees.  A large proportion of CEOs earned their 
undergraduate and graduate degrees from different universities.  Jalbert Rao and Jalbert (2002) also examine CEO 
compensation as it relates to the school attended, finding significant disparities between the number of students 
placed in CEO roles and the salaries their graduates earn in those roles.  They find little evidence to suggest that firm 
C 
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performance is affected by the CEOs educational background.   
 
The current research is a direct extension Jalbert Rao and Jalbert (2002).  This study examines data for the 
subsequent ten years from 1997-2006.  A great deal has changed in the CEO marketplace in the ten years since the 
Jalbert Rao and Jalbert (2002) study was completed including corporate scandals at Enron, Tyco, Worldcom and 
other firms as well as passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002.  Moreover, companies that offer large CEO 
compensation packages are faced with increasing criticism. These events have changed relationships between 
stockholders, boards, employees and CEO's.  Due to these significant changes, an additional look at CEO 
compensation and firm performance is warranted.  This paper extends the literature in some instances by utilizing 
more recent data, in other instances by using a different dataset and it extends the general body of literature by 
examining different variables as they relate to CEO compensation and firm performance. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the literature related to 
executive compensation.  This section is followed by a discussion of the data utilized in the paper and a presentation 
of some summary statistics.  The paper continues with a presentation and discussion of the empirical results.  
Finally, the paper closes with some concluding comments. 
 
SECTION 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A plethora of articles have examined CEO performance and compensation.  In this section we review 
selected articles from this body of literature.  Jalbert, Jalbert and Perrina (2004) examined specific degrees earned by 
CEOs.  Of interest is to determine if those with differing degrees, such as an MBA, are more likely to be the CEO of 
a large firm. They found a large proportion of firms are managed by CEOs whom earned an MBA.  They further 
found those with differing degrees have been with the firm for differing numbers of years, earned their 
undergraduate and graduate degrees at different ages, started working for the firm at different ages, became the CEO 
at differing ages, and were with the firm for differing lengths of time prior to becoming the CEO.   
 
Gottesman and Morey (2006) examined the relationship between quality of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
education and firm performance using EXECUCOMP data.  They find no evidence that firms with CEOs from more 
prestigious schools, as measured by average SAT and GMAT scores, outperform those from less prestigious 
schools. They also find that firms managed by CEOs with MBA or law degrees perform no better than firms with 
CEOs that do not have a graduate degree.  They find some evidence that firms led by CEOs with non-MBA, non-
law graduate degrees have slightly better risk-adjusted market performance than other firms. Finally, they find that 
compensation is somewhat higher for CEOs who attended more prestigious schools.  This paper extends this work 
by examining a different, larger, dataset and controlling for different variables. 
 
Collier and Wilson (1994) surveyed Chief Financial Officers of Fortune 1,000 companies on their 
educational choices.  They find undergraduate work was spread among a larger number of schools than graduate 
education.  When asked about their educational choices, they found that retrospective preferences were similar to 
actual choices. 
 
Palia (2000) examined how educational background of a CEO impacts the types of firms they are selected 
to manage.  He compared the performance of individuals that earned their degree from top undergraduate or 
graduate schools to those who earned their degree from less prestigious schools.  They found managers with lower 
quality educational backgrounds manage firms in regulated industries, while those with higher quality educational 
backgrounds manage firms in unregulated industries.  Other papers that address this issue include Joskow, Rose and 
Shephard (1993) and Jensen and Murphy (1990). 
 
Hambrick and Masson (1984), and Capenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders (2004), discussed the role of 
management team homogeneity as it relates to decision making speed.  The general argument is that homogeneous 
top management teams make strategic decisions more quickly and are more profitable than heterogeneous teams in 
stable environments.  Westphal and Zajac (1995) examined 413, Fortune 500, companies and found that boards of 
directors prefer CEO’s who are demographically similar to themselves including on an educational basis.  Greater 
similarity between board members and CEO demographics result in higher CEO compensation.  This body of 
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literature suggests that CEO selection should focus on individuals that provide homogeneity among the leadership 
team. 
 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) examined educational backgrounds and other demographic variables of 
mutual fund managers.  They measured university quality based on average SAT score of the manager’s 
undergraduate university.  They find that funds whose managers are from better quality universities outperform 
funds managed by other managers on a risk adjusted basis. 
 
Barker and Mueller (2002) examined how CEO background is related to R&D spending.  They found the 
amount of CEO education does not impact R&D spending for CEO’s with a bachelor’s degree.  However, 
significant R&D spending increases are found at firms where the CEO has an advanced science degree.  
 
Gabaix and Landier (2008) addressed the question of why CEO pay has increased so much.  Their findings 
indicate that increases in CEO pay from 1980 through 2003 can be fully attributed to a sixflold increase in market 
capitalization of large companies during the same period.  They further found a small difference in CEO talent 
justifies large pay differences.  Hermalin (2005) argues that CEO compensation increases can be explained by 
improved corporate governance.  Higher pay is required to compensate for the increased chance of being fired.  
 
Palia and Ravid (2002) examined differences between founding CEO’s and non-founder CEO’s.  They 
developed and tested a model where founders work harder and become endogenously entrenched.  They found that 
founders tend to be less responsive to performance incentives.  They also found that founder run firms are more 
profitable.  However, they found that firms led by family members of the original founders had lower market values.  
Fahlenbrach (2009) found that firms managed by a founder invest more in R&D, have higher capital expenditures 
and made more focused mergers and acquisitions.  He also found that after controlling for a number of factors, 
investing in founder managed firms produced a 4.4% annual abnormal return.  Jalbert and Jalbert (2005) also 
compared founding CEO’s to non-founding CEO’s.  The evidence shows that founders draw a substantially higher 
compensation than their non-founder counterparts, but this difference depends upon the academic degrees that the 
individuals hold.  Moreover the authors found significant differences between founders and non-founders in the ages 
when  CEOs earned their degrees, age at which they started working for the company and age at which they become 
CEO.  Founders tend to finish their degrees prior to entering the work force, while non-founders tend to enter the 
workforce prior to earning their degree. 
 
SECTION 3:  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Each year since 1973, Forbes magazine has published a list containing information about the CEO’s of 
large United States companies.  Specifically, Forbes examines compensation and as many as thirty other variables 
for as many as 800 CEOs each year.  In 2002, the number of firms included in the analysis was reduced to 500.  
Firms included in the list are identified based on several firm size measures.  The Forbes list contains background 
and compensation information about each firm's CEO.  The Forbes compensation list is the foundation for this 
study.  Some of the data utilized in this study were obtained in electronic format from Forbes, while others were 
obtained from lists presented on the Forbes website.  Since 1987, Forbes has published information on the university 
the CEO attended.  This educational background information is of interest in this paper. 
 
A previous study in this series examines data prior to 1997.  To avoid repetition, data for this paper is 
limited to the ten year period 1997-2006 including 6,305 annual observations.  The number of observations in each 
year are presented in Table 1.  Observations numbers do not remain constant in each year because Forbes reduced 
the number of firms included in the list as noted above.    Reducing the data to an equal sample size in each year 
would have been optimal due to the unequal sample sizes across year.  Unfortunately an unbiased reduction was not 
possible because Forbes does not report the criteria that it used to select firms for inclusion in the sample.   
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Table 1*:  Sample Statistics 
Year Forbes Observations 
1997 800 
1998 800 
1999 892 
2000 812 
2001 501 
2002 500 
2003 500 
2004 500 
2005 500 
2006 500 
Total 6,305 
This table shows data on the sample analyzed in this paper.  The column labeled Forbes Observations indicates the number of 
CEOs listed in the Forbes Dataset.   
 
 
For thirty-six observations, the data indicated the CEO had a graduate degree, but did not have an 
undergraduate degree suggesting obvious missing data.  An internet search was conducted to complete the dataset.  
Data for eighteen observations were identified in this manner.  The remaining observations were coded as missing 
data. 
  
In order to facilitate additional tests, each firm in the Forbes list was matched with its corresponding ticker 
symbol and matched with corresponding data from Standard and Poor’s Compustat.    
 
The analysis considers two sets of dependent variables and two sets of independent variables.  These 
variables are discussed in the following two sections. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
The first set of dependent variables measure compensation earned by the CEO.     Of interest in this paper 
is the extent to which university attended impacts the compensation that a CEO earns. While the Jalbert, Rao and 
Jalbert (2002) study was limited to examining total compensation, this study examines three measures of 
compensation.  Total compensation, TC, is the total compensation provided by the firm to the CEO as obtained from 
Forbes.   It includes salary, bonus, stock compensation and other compensation.  Total compensation indicates the 
reward CEOs  receive for all activities performed for the firm.  These activities include managing the firm as well as 
providing capital for the firm.  Salary, SAL, and salary plus bonus SB, variables are analyzed to identify the impact 
of education on various components of service provided by the CEO.  By eliminating the non-salary and not-bonus 
elements of total compensation, these variables eliminate rewards for investment activities from the analysis.  These 
two variables measure the return to human capital.  Murphy (2003) and Murphy and Hall (2002), among others, 
have documented the importance of differentiating between compensation components. 
 
The second set of dependent variables measure CEO performance.  A great deal of research examines the 
relationship between CEO compensation and various performance measures.  Many individuals argue that CEO 
compensation is excessive.  However, if higher paid CEO's produce superior returns for investors, large 
compensation packages are justified.  This paper examines the extent to which school attended impacts firm 
performance.  Return on Assets, ROA,  Return on Equity, ROE, and Return on Investment, ROI, measure firm 
performance in this study.   
 
Independent Variables 
 
The analysis considers four groups of independent variables.  The first group measures CEO educational 
background.  UGATT and GATT indicate if the CEO earned an undergraduate or graduate degree respectively.  In 
each case, values of one and zero indicate the CEO did, or did not, earn the degree respectively.  A second set of 
education variables indicate the school attended.  Universities are classified based on the number of CEO's 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2011 Volume 27, Number 1 
19 
graduating from the institution.   The variable TOP1U indicates the university that provided an undergraduate 
education to the largest number of CEOs.  TOP5U indicated the five universities that provided an undergraduate 
education to the largest number of CEOs.  Similarly, TOP10U, TOP25U and TOP50U indicate top 10, 25 and 50 
undergraduate universities respectively.  Variables are also developed for graduate school rankings, TOP1G-
TOP50G and combined rankings, TOP1C-TOP50C.   
 
A second group of independent variables measure other demographic characteristics of the CEO.  
Wiersema and Bantel (1992), established that demographic attributes of CEOs affected firm performance and the 
firm’s business decisions including youth, tenure, educational level, and functional background.  The second group 
of independent variables capture the effects of CEO demographic characteristics.  Lucier, Schuyt, and Spiegel 
(2003) found that individuals average 50 years of age when promoted to the CEO position.  Berry, Bisjak, Lemmon, 
and Naveen (2000) found that average CEO age is about 56.7 years. Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) found that 
CEOs tend to leave their appointments at ages 64 and 65.  Sundaram and Yermak (2007) and Wesphal and Zajac 
(1995) found a negative relationship between CEO age and attitude toward risk.  Thomas and Peyrefitte (1996) 
found older CEOs have a positive impact on firm performance, after controlling for the affects of industry.  Jalbert 
Rao and Jalbert (2002) found a positive relationship between CEO age and compensation but no relationship 
between CEO age and firm performance. Barro and Barro (1990) found that the pay-performance sensitivity of bank 
CEOs diminished with CEO experience.  Contrasting these findings are Brick Palmon and Wald (2003), who found 
that age is not significant in explaining compensation.  To measure the impact of CEO age on compensation and 
performance, the variable CEOAGE, is incorporated in the analysis.  
 
Brick, Palmon and Wald (2003) found experience was positively related to compensation.  Jalbert Rao and 
Jalbert (2002) found a negative relationship between years with the firm and CEO compensation and argue their 
findings indicate salary compression among CEOs.  Kato and Rockel (1992b) found that Japanese CEO's are with 
the firm longer than U.S. CEOs prior to becoming CEO.  To identify how experience affects compensation and 
performance, we include two experience variables in our analysis.  The first variable, the number of years a CEO 
has been with the firm, YRSCO measures firm specific experience. The second variable, the number of years the 
individual has served as CEO, measures experience in their current role.   
 
Fahlenbrach (2004) found that firms managed by a founder had higher capital expenditures, made more 
focused mergers and acquisitions, and provided positive abnormal returns to their investors. Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert 
(2002) and Jalbert and Jalbert (2005) found that founder CEO's earned higher total compensation than their non-
founder counterparts.  However, the results of Palia, Ravid and Wang (2008), He (2008) and others contradict these 
findings.  Their evidence indicates that non-founding CEO's earn more than founders.  Some founders have even 
been known to take a token $1 in annual compensation (Plitch, 2005).  While the evidence on founder pay is mixed, 
the evidence strongly suggests that founder managed firms outperform non-founder managed firms.  Jalbert, Rao 
and Jalbert's (2002) results indicate that founders on average provided a seven percent higher ROA than other CEOs.  
Fahlengrach's (2005) results show that founder CEO’s achieved an 11% higher return for investors.  Adams, 
Almeida and Ferreira (2009) use an instrumental variables approach, also finding a positive relationship between 
CEO founder and performance. To capture the effect that a founding CEO has on the firm, the variable FOUNDER 
is included in the analysis indicating if the current CEO founded the firm.   
 
While the issue of compensation differences by gender has been examined extensively in the literature, no 
known study has examined the role of CEO gender in determining compensation or firm performance. A particular 
lack of evidence exists regarding gender differences at the highest CEO ranks.  To measure the impact of gender on 
compensation and firm performance each observation was coded by CEO gender.  In instances when gender was not 
clear from the name, company documents and an internet search were used to identify the gender. The variable 
GENDER is coded 1=Male and 2=Female. 
 
The third set of independent variables measure the managerial behavior of CEOs.  CEOs exert exclusive or 
significant control over a number of managerial issues.  Capital structure represents one such variable.  Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) wrote the seminal article on capital structure.  Since then, many articles have extended this line of 
literature including Modigliani and Miller (1963); Miller (1977); DeAngelo and Masulis (1980); and Jalbert (2002).  
One line of literature suggests that the structure of CEO compensation should be a function of firm risk, leverage, 
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size, and growth opportunities of the firm (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; and Prendergast, 2002).  John and John 
(1993) found a negative relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and leverage.  To capture issues 
associated with leverage the long term debt to equity ratio, LTDE, of the firm is incorporated in the analysis. 
 
CEOs are also instrumental in determining dividend policies.  Miller and Modigliani (1961) proposed an 
irrelevance theory suggesting that in an idealized world, dividends do not affect firm value.  Many authors have 
extended this work. One line of literature focuses on the role of dividends in monitoring firm managers 
(Easterbrook, 1984).  Bhattacharyya, Mawani and Morrill (2008a and 2008b) find a negative relationship between 
dividend payout and executive compensation among Canadian and U.S firms. The dividend payout ratio of the firm, 
PAYOUT, is incorporated into the analysis to capture these effects. 
 
The relationship between firm size and a variety of firm characteristics and performance issues is well 
established.  Identification of the size effect as it relates to stock returns is generally attributed to Banz (1981) and 
Reinganum (1981). More recent studies examine the relationship between firm size and CEO compensation (see 
Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert, 2002; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Baker Jensen and Murphy, 1988 and Baker and Hall, 
2002).  The general findings are that CEOs of larger firms earn more money.  The analysis here incorporates total 
assets, ASSETS, as a measure of firm size. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) wrote the seminal article on the relationship between proportion of the firm 
owned by an employee and his/her motivations.   They argued that increasing the proportion of the firm owned by 
managers aligned the managers’ interests with those of the shareholders.  Fama (1980), on the other hand, argued 
that a properly functioning labor market for managers served to minimize agency problems.   The percentage of the 
company owned by the CEO,  POWN, is included in the analysis to capture ownership structure effects. 
 
Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) argued that promotion based reward systems are only effective in 
growing firms.  They provided evidence of a positive relationship between sales growth and CEO compensation.  
Gabaix and Landier (2008) found evidence to suggest that increases in CEO pay can be largely attributable to 
increases in firm size.  Murphy (1985) found that after controlling for firm size a ten percent firm growth rate 
implies a CEO compensation increase of between 2 and 3 percent.  To capture the effects of growth on CEO 
compensation and performance sales growth, SGROW, is included in the analysis. 
 
Jensen (1986a, 1986b) argued that managers are improperly motivated in firms with slow growth but free 
cash flow.  In these instances, promotion based reward systems encourage managers to undertake unprofitable 
growth opportunities rather than pay dividends.  Jensen (1986a) argued that information asymmetries between 
managers and owners motivate managers to over-invest.  Free cash flows are used for unprofitable investments 
which increase managerial utility. Broussard, Buchenroth and Pilotte (2004) found evidence that pay for 
performance reduces underinvestment of cash flows due to managerial shirking.  To capture the impact of cash 
flows on CEO compensation and performance free cash flow, FCF, is included in the analysis. 
 
Evidence on the relationship between CEO compensation and stock returns is mixed.  Pennathur and Shelor 
(2002) identified a positive relationship between CEO compensation and stock returns in the real estate industry.  
Dechow (2006) found that CEO pay is more sensitive to negative stock returns than positive stock returns.  
Bebchuck, Cremers and Peyer (2009), examined CEO compensation relative to the five highest paid executives in 
the firm, finding that larger CEO pay proportions are associated with lower firm value, lower profitability and lower 
stock returns.  Cooper, M.J. H. Gulen and P. R. Rau (2009) found that CEO pay is negatively related to future 
shareholder wealth changes.  The firms with CEOs in the top ten percent of pay earned 13% negative abnormal 
returns over the subsequent five years.  In this study, we incorporate two measures of stock returns.  One year 
returns, ONEyrRET, measures the current relationship between compensation and performance and THyrRET, three 
year returns, measures the relationship between compensation and longer term performance. 
 
A final group of independent variables control for other factors that may affect CEO compensation.  Beaty 
and Zajac (1994) found the use of executive compensation contracts to motivate managers is limited by managerial 
risk aversion.  Sundaram and Yermak (2007) and Wesphal and Zajac (1995) found a negative relationship between 
CEO age and attitude toward risk.  Many others have documented a relationship between firm performance and 
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various measures of risk.  Here, two measures of risk are incorporated into the analysis.  Fama and French (1993 and 
1995) proposed book-to-market as a measure of risk.  We incorporate the price-to-book ratio, PtoB, in our model.  In 
addition we incorporate a new measure of risk, earnings stability, ESTAB,  into the model that is available from 
Compustat.  The Compustat earnings stability score ranks firms from 1 to 5 based on the stability of their earnings.  
 
It is well known that firms in different industries operate differently and compensate their CEO’s 
differently. Datta and Guthrie (1994) suggested that industry specific experience is essential for CEOs.  Roach and 
Goedde (2003) examined CEO compensation in the pharmaceutical industry. John, Saunders and Senbet, 2000; and 
Hermalin and Wallace, 2001 examined CEO compensation in the banking industry and Barragato (2002) examined 
executive compensation in the hospital industry.  Each of these studies noted peculiarities of executive 
compensation based on industry.  Joskow, Rose and Wolfram (1996) show that political and regulatory constraints 
had an effect on CEO compensation in utility industries.  Rajagopalan and Datta (1996) found that industry plays a 
limited role in explaining variations in CEO demographics.  To control for industry effects, the firms were classified 
by two-digit industry sector codes.  A categorical variable of industry sectors was included in the regression models. 
 
Gabaix and Landier (2008) Hermalin (2005) documented time varying changes in compensation.  Inflation, 
changing economy-wide fortunes, political pressure, regulations and other exogenous time varying factors have been 
found to impact compensation and firm performance.  A time indicator, YEAR, is included to control for changes in 
compensation over time.   
 
SECTION 4:  UNIVERSITY RANKINGS 
 
This section presents two university rankings.  The first is based on the number of graduates that a 
university has placed in a top CEO position and the second is based on the average compensation of graduates that 
become a top CEO. 
 
Ranking by University Attended 
 
Table 2 presents university rankings by number of graduates placed in top CEO positions.  Schools placing 
more of their graduates in top CEO positions rank higher.  The first set of columns ranks schools based on 
undergraduate degrees conferred.  The second set of columns ranks universities based on graduate degrees 
conferred.  The third set of columns ranks universities based on conferring either an undergraduate or a graduate 
degree to a top CEO.     
 
The undergraduate rankings are reported in Panel A of Table 2.  Of 6305 total observations, 5,782 
observations involved a CEO that earned an undergraduate degree.  From the remaining 523 observations, 505 
observations involved a CEO that did not hold an undergraduate degree, and undergraduate information was not 
available for eighteen observations.  Four hundred eighty eight institutions were responsible for providing an 
undergraduate education to at least one CEO.  The undergraduate analysis indicates a very clear pecking order for 
selection as a CEO of a major U.S. company.  Harvard is responsible for providing an undergraduate education to 
210 observations, about 3.3 percent of all CEOs and about 3.6 of CEOs that had a degree.  Overall, the rankings 
differ considerably from those presented in Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert, 2002.  For example in the undergraduate 
rankings, Yale improves in ranking from 6th to second, and University of Wisconsin improves in ranking from 13th 
to fourth place. 
 
Table 3 presents additional details on the proportion of CEOs educated by various groups of schools.  The 
top five schools provided an undergraduate education for 677 observations, about 10.7 percent of all CEOs and 11.7 
of CEOs that had a degree.  The top ten schools provided an undergraduate-educated 1084 observations representing 
17.2 percent of all CEOs and 18.7 percent of CEOs with an undergraduate degree.  
 
 
 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2011 Volume 27, Number 1 
22 
Table 2*:  Educational Background by School 
 Panel A:  Undergrad Schools Panel B: Grad. Schools Panel C:  Undergrad and Grad. 
Rank School N School N School N 
 Total Observations 6,305 Total Observations 6.305 Total Obs. 6,305 
 No Undergrad Ed 500 No Graduate Ed 2,660 No UG or No G 500 
1 Harvard 210 Harvard 601 Harvard 722 
2 Princeton 142 Stanford 188 Pennsylvania 240 
3 Stanford 118 Pennsylvania 160 Stanford 239 
4 Wisconsin Madison 109 Columbia 152 Princeton 183 
5 Pennsylvania 98 MIT 105 Columbia 161 
6 Yale 89 Northwestern 95 MIT 139 
7 Dartmouth 81 Chicago 92 Yale 129 
8 Cornell 80 NYU 85 NYU 127 
9 CUNY City 79 Virginia 82 Northwestern 120 
10 Purdue 78 USC 55 Wisconsin 115 
11 Notre Dame 77 Texas 50 Virginia 110 
12 Texas 74 Michigan 50 Dartmouth 107 
13 Duke 69 Dartmouth 48 Texas 103 
14 North Carolina 63 Indiana 48 Cornell 100 
15 U.S. Naval Academy 61 Yale 42 Chicago 95 
16 Alabama 59 Princeton 41 Purdue 91 
17 Missouri 57 Rutgers 39 CUNY City 86 
18 Northwestern 57 George Washington 38 Duke 83 
19 Washington 57 Wisconsin 36 USC 79 
20 UCLA 53 Cornell 34 Michigan 79 
21 Rutgers 47 Case Western 30 Notre Dame 77 
22 MIT 46 UCLA 30 Washington 71 
23 NYU 45 Purdue 29 Rutgers 70 
24 Denison 44 Boston U. 28 UCLA 69 
25 Ohio State 43 Houston 28 North Carolina 64 
26 Colorado 41 Washington 27 U.S. Naval Academy 61 
27 Georgia 41 Wisconsin – Milwaukee 26 Alabama 60 
28 Iowa 41 Xavier 25 Indiana 57 
29 Auburn 40 Berkeley 24 Missouri 57 
30 Lehigh 40 Georgetown 24 Illinois 56 
31 Utah 40 Pace 24 Vanderbilt 53 
32 Michigan 40 Illinois 23 Ohio State 51 
33 Illinois 40 Loyola 23 Colorado 48 
34 Fordham 39 SMU 23 Villanova 48 
35 USC 38 Villanova 22 Minnesota 46 
36 Vanderbilt 36 Syracuse 21 Boston U  45 
37 Pittsburgh 34 Duke 20 Fordham 45 
38 Virginia 33 DePaul 20 Denison 44 
39 Villanova 33 Georgia State 19 George Washington 43 
40 Minnesota 32 Minnesota 19 SMU 43 
41 U.S. Military Acad. 31 Pittsburg 19 Georgia 42 
42 Williams College 31 Florida 18 Iowa 41 
43 Georgia Tech 30 Pepperdine 18 Loyola (IL) 41 
44 Miami U. Ohio 30 Wake Forest 18 Michigan State 41 
45 Michigan State 30 Michigan State 17 Pittsburgh 41 
46 Northeastern 30 Vanderbilt 17 Auburn 40 
47 Penn State 30 CUNY City 17 Georgetown 40 
48 Arizona 29 Creighton 16 Lehigh 40 
49 Manhattan College 29 Denver 16 Tufts 40 
50 Brown 28 Emory 16 Utah 40 
 Oklahoma State 28 Brooklyn Law 16 Wisconsin - Milwaukee 40 
 SMU 28 Washington U. 16   
 Texas A&M 28     
 Tufts 28     
 Top 50 Total 2,802* Top 50 Total 2,698 Top 50 Schools 4,623 
 Other Schools 2,980 Other Schools 947 Other Schools 3,929 
 Missing Observations 23    23 
This table ranks universities based on the number of graduates who managed one of the largest U.S. firms.  Column A ranks universities based on 
undergraduate degrees conferred.  Panel B ranks universities based on graduate degrees conferred.  Panel C ranks universities based on providing 
either an undergraduate or graduate degree to a student.  * Five Universities tied for the 50th ranking in the undergraduate education listing.   
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When comparing the results here with those of Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (JRJ) (2002), over the most recent 
ten years, Harvard has replaced Princeton as the number one provider of undergraduate education for these 
individuals.  Moreover, the number one school has taken on increasing importance over the past ten years.  In the 
earlier study, the top school educated 3.3 percent of all CEOs, increasing to 3.6 percent in the current study.  The top 
5, 10, 25 and 50 schools have taken on a slightly lower importance.  The percentage of CEOs educated by these 
schools has declined by 2 to 5 percent over the past ten years.   
 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the graduate school findings.  The results indicate that 3,643 observations 
involved a CEO that earned a graduate degree.  Two hundred thirty six different institutions were responsible for 
providing a graduate education to at least one CEO.  Harvard is the clear leader in providing graduate education 
having educated the CEOs of 600 observations, 9.5% of all CEOs and 16.4% of CEOs that have a graduate 
education.  While Harvard is clearly the heavyweight, it has decreased in importance slightly over the past ten years.  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.  The impact of the largest five and ten schools is amazing at 19.1 and 
33.1 percent of all CEO’s respectively.  The impact is even more pronounced when limiting the analysis to those 
individuals that have a graduate degree, with the top 10 schools educating 44.2 percent of all CEO’s with a graduate 
degree.  The top 50 schools are responsible for providing a graduate education to an amazing70 percent of those 
CEOs that hold a graduate degree.   
 
Next, a combined analysis is completed, identifying whether an individual earned either their 
undergraduate or graduate degree from a particular institution.  Regardless of the degree earned at a school, the 
individual would have a similar network of friends and similar access to placement services.  As such, university 
affiliation may be more critical to achieving the CEO career level than the particular degree earned from the 
university.  In this analysis we count an individual if they have earned either their graduate or undergraduate degree 
from a university and rank schools based on the combined degrees conferred.  To complete this analysis, the 
undergraduate and graduate lists were combined, resulting in 12,610 observations.  To avoid double counting, 
duplicate entries for individuals who received both the undergraduate and graduate degrees from the same institution 
were deleted.  Specifically, when the undergraduate school and graduate school for a CEO were the same, the 
graduate school entry was deleted.  This procedure resulted in 875 deleted observations.  Next, the 2,660 
observations that did not have an undergraduate degree, and an additional 500 that did not have any higher education 
were deleted.  Finally, the 23 missing observations noted earlier were deleted.  This procedure netted 8,552 unique 
contributions to the CEO's educational experience.  Of the 6305 observations 3643 involved an individual that 
attended graduate school of which, 2,768 earned their undergraduate and graduate degrees at different institutions. 
 
Panel C of Table 2 shows the combined analysis results.  The rankings again clearly demonstrate the 
importance of Harvard University in educating CEOs.  Harvard is responsible for providing either an undergraduate 
or graduate degree to the CEO associated with 722 observations.  Some statistics on the significance of this figure 
are presented in Table 3.  This 722 figure represents 11.5 percent of all CEOs and 12.5 percent of CEOs having a 
college degree.  Harvard increased its importance over the past 10 years from 11.1 and 12.1 percent respectively. 
 
 
Table 3:  Summary of Top School Representation 
 Undergrad Graduate Graduate or Undergraduate 
School Count All 
CEO’s 
With 
degree 
Count All 
CEO’s 
With 
Degree 
Count All 
CEO’s 
With 
Degree 
Top School 210 3.3 3.6 601 9.5 16.5 722 11.5 12.5 
Top 5 School 677 10.7 11.7 1206 19.1 33.1 1545 24.5 26.7 
Top 10 School 1084 17.2 18.7 1615 25.6 44.3 2175 34.5 37.6 
Top 25 School 1936 30.7 33.5 2186 34.7 60.0 3459 54.9 59.8 
Top 50 School 2801 44.4 48.4 2698 42.8 74.0 4623 73.3 80.0 
All Others 2980 47.2  947 15 25.9 1159 18.3 20.0 
Did Not Earn 500 7.9  2660 42.2  500 7.9  
Missing Obs. 23 0.5  0 0  23 0.5  
This table shows the percentage of CEO’s produced by schools with different ranks.   
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Table 4:  Total Compensation By School in 2006 dollars 
 Panel A:  Undergrad Schools Panel B: Grad. Schools Panel C:  Undergrad and Grad. 
Rank School Comp. School Comp. School Comp. 
 No Undergrad Ed 13,390 No Graduate Ed 9,573 UG but no Grad 8,595 
1 CUNY Queens 59,207 CUNY City 44,866 CUNY Queens 59,207 
2 American U Beirut 54,355 Illinois 27,532 Middlebury C 41,539 
3 Middlebury C 41,539 USC 26,945 Williams C 36,950 
4 Pace U NY 41,069 Boston U 20,737 SUNY Buffalo 35,621 
5 Long Is. U 38,703 Yale 15,009 American U Beirut 33,061 
6 Williams C 36,950 NYU 14,816 Long Is. U 30,337 
7 U of Massachusetts 30,171 U of Minnesota 14,655 Denison 28,238 
8 Denison 28,238 Indiana U 13,736 U of Massachusetts 25,329 
9 West Virginia 22,038 Widener U 13,157 West Virginia 22,038 
10 U of Colorado 18,619 U of Washington 13,123 CUNY City 21,022 
11 Cornell 18,408 U of Penn-Wharton 12,935 USC 20,172 
12 NYU 18,285 Stanford 12,389 Boston 19,589 
13 Boston 17,700 Colorado 10,868 Pace U NY 19,039 
14 Texas Tech 17,214 Princeton 10,717 Colorado 18,236 
15 Loyola Marymount 16,875 MIT 10,643 Illinois 17,364 
16 NC State 16,330 Houston 10,509 Miami 17,339 
17 Stanford 15,933 Virginia 9,749 Baylor 16,777 
18 Illinois 13,902 Chicago 9,748 Texas Tech 16,364 
19 CUNY City 13,779 Kentucky 9,541 NYU 16,213 
20 George Washington 13,750 Harvard 9,446 Cornell 15,246 
21 Bowdoin College 13,350 Berkeley 9,284 NC State 15,229 
22 Fordham 13,292 Columbia 9,264 Minnesota 13,510 
23 US Military Acad 13,275 George Washington 9,081 Bowdoin College 13,350 
24 Brigham Young 13,181 Drexel 8,362 US Military Acad 13,275 
25 Cleveland State 12,431 U of Rochester 8,268 Brigham Young 13,181 
26 Weber State 12,300 Pepperdine 8,264 Widener U 13,157 
27 Loyola U (IL) 12,055 U of Florida 7,845 Cleveland State 12,431 
28 Dartmouth 12,041 U of Denver 7,790 U of Memphis 12,378 
29 Minnesota 11,701 Duquesne 7,549 Weber State 12,300 
30 Mississippi 11,602 Rutgers 7,519 Indiana U 12,252 
31 William & Mary 11,478 Wis Madison 7,510 Fordham 12,224 
32 Georgia State U 11,471 Wis Milwaukee 7,396 Western Illinois 11,844 
33 Villanova 11,337 Utah 7,253 Stanford 11,562 
34 UCLA 11,107 Case Institute of Tec 7,221 U of Pennsylvania 11,521 
35 Texas El Paso 11,075 Akron 7,166 Loyola C (Md) 11,452 
36 Rhode Island 10,973 Ohio State 7,027 Texas El Paso 11,075 
37 San Jose State U 10,945 Carnegie Mellon 6,837 William & Mary 10,725 
38 Tufts U 10,491 Cornell 6,658 Dartmouth 10,612 
39 Mississippi State 10,119 Pace U NY 6,410 Mississippi State 10,119 
40 USC 10,107 Kansas 6,305 San Jose State 9,935 
41 Colgate U 9,725 Fairleigh Dickinson 6,150 Houston 9,794 
42 Wellesley C 9,564 Northwestern 6,059 MIT 9,752 
43 Washburn U 9,285 UCLA 5,909 Colgate 9,725 
44 SUNY New Paltz 9,075 Syracuse 5,869 Wellesley C 9,564 
45 Notre Dame 9,056 Tufts U 5,697 U of Chicago 9,489 
46 Pennsylvania 8,751 U of South Carolina 5,680 Harvard 9,378 
47 Indian Tech 8,592 Washington 5,661 Villanova 9,365 
48 Trinity College CT 8,479 Xavier 5,652 Washburn 9,285 
49 Georgia 8,439 Villanova 5,562 UCLA 9,146 
50 Union C 8,433 Michigan 5,405 U of Cal-Davis 9,120 
 Average Comp. 9,300   Grad & UG Same Sch. 8,295 
     Grad & UG Diff. Sch 9,352 
This table ranks schools based on the inflation adjusted average total compensation of graduates in top CEO positions.  The Same sch. and 
different school salary levels are not significantly different at the 10 percent level using a T-test for differences in means.  Only universities that 
had eleven or more observations were considered for the analysis.  The figures in each cell are in thousands of dollars. 
 
 
Collectively, the top 50 schools provided either an undergraduate or graduate degree to 73.3 percent of all 
CEOs and 80 percent of those CEOs that possess a degree.  These figures are down about three percent from the 
previous decade indicating that other schools are making some inroads in placing their graduates in top CEO 
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positions.  Nevertheless, it is clearly advisable for an individual who wishes to become the CEO of a large U.S. firm 
to gain admission to a top tier school.   
 
Ranking by Total Compensation 
 
In this analysis, we rank schools based on total compensation their graduates earn in top CEO positions.  
To complete this analysis we recomputed CEO total compensation to adjust for inflation.  This computation is made 
to adjust the total compensation to constant 2006 dollars.   Next, we compute the average annual total compensation 
earned by the CEOs from each university.  Finally universities are ranked based on the adjusted total compensation 
figure.  In completing the ranking universities that had fewer than 11 observations were eliminated from 
consideration.  This procedure guarantees that at least two individual CEOs were involved in the average total 
compensation calculations. 
 
The results are presented in Table 4.  The figure in each cell is the inflation adjusted average compensation 
in thousands of dollars earned by graduates from each school.  Similar to the previous table, Panel A reports the 
results for undergraduate degrees, Panel B reports the results for graduate degrees and Panel C reports the results for 
combined degrees.  The results indicate a significant discrepancy between those schools that are outstanding at 
placing their graduates as denoted in Tables 2 and 3, and those whose graduates earn top dollar.  Interestingly, 
despite its impressive numeric showing in the compensation list, Harvard did not make the top 50 undergraduate 
compensation listing. The remaining top ten schools from Table 2 fared little better.  Only five of the top ten 
placement schools achieved the top 50 compensation list.  No school was able to make the top ten on both lists.  
Stanford University is the highest ranked school to demonstrate consistency in both number of CEO’s and average 
total compensation.  Stanford ranked 3, 2 and 3 in CEO numbers and 17, 12, and 33 in compensation for the 
undergraduate graduate and combined analyses respectively. 
 
CUNY Queens graduates draw far and away the largest compensation packages in the undergraduate and 
combined listings.  The differences are particularly striking in the combined analysis.  CUNY Queens graduates 
average total compensation is $59,207,000 per year.  Second place, Middlebury College graduates earned 
$41,539,000 per year.  Interestingly CUNY City graduate school graduates earn the highest compensation at 
$44,866,000, well ahead of second place University of Illinois graduates that earned $27,532,000 per year.  CUNY 
places two schools among the top ten in the combined category, CUNY Queens and CUNY City.   
 
Interestingly, CEOs that earned their undergraduate and graduate degrees from the same university earned 
$8,295,000 on average while those that attended a different school for their undergraduate and graduate studies 
earned $9,352,000 on average.  Somewhat surprisingly, given the rather large average difference, a t-tests indicates 
that this difference is not significant at the ten percent level. 
 
One particularly notable difference between this study and Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert, 2002 is the appearance 
of Long Island University in the Rankings.  While Long Island University was not ranked in the earlier study, it 
enters the rankings in an impressive 5th place for undergraduate and combined rankings. Dickinson and Fairleigh 
Dickinson ranked 9th and 12th in the earlier study, but did not enter the top 50 rankings in this study. 
 
SECTION 5:  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The empirical analysis begins by regressing each educational variable on each compensation variable.  For 
example, the first regression in Table 5 regresses the possession of an undergraduate degree, UGATT, on total 
Compensation, TC, as follows:  
 
                 (1) 
 
The results from Equation 1 regressions are presented in Table 5. In Panels A, B and C each  education 
variables is regressed on Total Compensation, Salary plus Bonus and Salary respectively.  The first figure in each 
cell is the regression coefficient.  The second figure in each cell is the t-statistic along with a significance indicator.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  The results in Panel A show that 
the coefficient on UGATT is negative and significant at the one percent level.  This finding is consistent with those 
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of Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002), who also found that CEO's who do not have an undergraduate degree earn more 
than those that do.  Several plausible explanations can be forwarded for this finding.  It is possible that CEO's who 
do not attend school achieve their position because of family relationships or family stock holdings rather than their 
educational background.  The undergraduate and combined university regressions show no significant explanatory 
power for total compensation.  However, the graduate school regressions do have explanatory power with the 
Top10, Top25 and Top50 groups showing a significantly positive relationship. 
 
Results from the regression on salary plus bonus appear in Panel B of Table 5.  The results show that 
attending an undergraduate or graduate school are not significant in explaining salary plus bonus.  However, 
attending a top university does impact the salary and bonus earned.  The results are significant for top five and top 
ten undergraduate universities, each measure of quality graduate school as well as top one, ten and twenty-five 
combined universities. 
 
Results from the regression on salary alone are presented in Table 5, Panel C.  The results indicate that 
earning an undergraduate degree is significant in explaining salary, but earning a graduate degree is not significant.  
The results indicate that having attended the top undergraduate school (Harvard) is negatively significant in 
explaining salary.  This indicates that Harvard graduates, while occupying many top CEO positions, earn a lower 
salary than their counterparts from other schools.  No other undergraduate measures are significant in explaining 
salary.  Each graduate school category has positive explanatory power for salary at the one percent level.    The 
combined university categories explain salary positively and significantly with the exception of the top university.   
 
Taken together, the evidence from Table 5 suggests that school attended, particularly the graduate school 
attended, impacts salary to a great extent.  However, the results indicate that  school attended impacts salary plus 
bonus and total compensation to a lesser degree.  This is perhaps not surprising.  Salary may be more related to the 
background of the CEO including universities attended. Bonus and Total Compensation may be more related to 
performance and stock investments in the firm.   
 
To further examine this issue, a series of control variables are included in the compensation regressions.  
The estimated equation for the first column of results in Table 6 is: 
 
                                                                 
                                                           
                                                       
  (2) 
 
Results of regressions on total compensation are presented in Table 6.  The columns present the results 
when various educational variables are substituted into Equation 2. The first two columns include the degree earned 
variables UGATT and GATT.  Columns three through five provide an analysis for top undergraduate, graduate and 
combined schools respectively.  The coefficients and significance of the control variables in the top school 
regressions were quite similar across measures.   Thus, the control variables are presented only for the TOP 10 
education variable.  Coefficients for the education variables obtained from separate regressions are presented at the 
bottom of the table. 
 
The results in Table 6 show that earning a degree or the quality of degree earned do not explain total 
compensation after controlling for other variables.  Nevertheless, the control variables provide some insights.  CEO 
age is positively significant in explaining total compensation.  Older CEOs earn more than younger CEOs.   Years 
with the company is not significant in explaining total compensation, a finding that contradicts those of Jalbert Rao 
and Jalbert (2002) who found a negatively significant relationship between years with the company and total 
compensation.  Founder is significantly positive.  The magnitude of the founder coefficient, exceeding 5,000, 
suggests that founders earn some $5 million more than their non-founder counterparts.  This finding is consistent 
with Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002) who presented similar results. While the coefficient on GENDER is large, it is 
not significant.  This could be the result of the relatively few female CEOs in the data, or indeed the absence of 
gender discrimination.   
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Table 5:  Regressions on Compensation Components 
Panel A:  Total Compensation 
Independent Variable N Intercept Coefficient T-Statistic 
UGATT 6194 11,531.37 -3,607.20 -3.26*** 
GATT 6199 8453.70 -391.74 -0.63 
Top 1U 6199 8255.20 -914.01 -0.53 
Top 5U 6199 8181.21 413.97 0.419 
Top 10U 6199 8045.67 1047.38 1.29 
Top 25U 6199 8154.39 232.03 0.350 
Top 50U 6199 8175.49 108.15 0.177 
Top 1G 6199 8212.75 1042.64 0.128 
Top 5G 6199 7987.49 1247.99 1.605 
Top 10G 6199 7724.64 1958.87 2.80*** 
Top 25G 6199 7715.35 1468.84 2.29** 
Top 50G 6199 7760.22 1072.20 1.74* 
Top 1C 6199 8219.71 959.73 0.052 
Top 5C 6199 8108.70 511.03 0.702 
Top 10C 6199 8023.22 655.30 0.991 
Top 25C 6199 7921.58 660.28 1.078 
Top 50C 6199 7748.42 803.41 1.292 
Panel B:  Salary and Bonus 
Independent Variable N Intercept Coef./Sig.  
UGATT 6244 3049.01 -195.73 -0.62 
GATT 6249 2770.67 177.48 0.992 
Top 1U 6249 2857.04 505.50 1.03 
Top 5U 6249 2803.15 661.55 2.32** 
Top 10U 6249 2787.23 505.06 2.157** 
Top 25U 6249 2813.55 196.93 1.03 
Top 50U 6249 2801.68 156.38 0.883 
Top 1G 6249 2819.86 567.25 1.89* 
Top 5G 6249 2792.42 428.44 1.91* 
Top 10G 6249 2727.76 573.22 2.83*** 
Top 25G 6249 2757.33 336.73 1.82* 
Top 50G 6249 2739.87 309.59 1.74* 
Top 1C 6249 2811.56 543.83 1.96** 
Top 5C 6249 2796.87 338.17 1.61 
Top 10C 6249 2773.63 325.58 1.70* 
Top 25C 6249 2708.43 359.64 2.03** 
Top 50C 6249 2736.24 232.09 1.29 
Panel C:  Salary Only 
Independent Variable N Intercept Coef./Sig.  
UGATT 5753 772.05 70.60 2.93*** 
GATT 5758 828.44 14.07 1.03 
Top 1U 5758 839.66 -93.47 2.468** 
Top 5U 5758 835.73 7.92 0.36 
Top 10U 5758 832.00 26.80 1.49 
Top 25U 5758 833.96 8.60 0.585 
Top 50U 5783 829.44 15.57 1.15 
Top 1G 5758 829.08 79.85 3.45*** 
Top 5G 5758 824.92 62.05 3.59*** 
Top 10G 5758 819.90 66.18 4.25*** 
Top 25G 5758 819.68 49.16 3.45*** 
Top 50G 5758 819.62 38.74 2.84*** 
Top 1C 5758 832.84 32.94 1.54 
Top 5C 5758 822.88 60.81 3.76*** 
Top 10C 5758 817.84 61.37 4.18*** 
Top 25C 5758 819.50 37.36 3.75*** 
Top 50C 5758 806.85 50.46 3.67*** 
This table shows the results of ordinary least squares  regressions on compensation components. Panel A reports the results of regressions on total 
compensation.  Panel B reports the results or regressions on salary and bonus.  Panel C reports the results of regressions on salary. UGATT and 
GATT are dummy variables indicating if the CEO has an undergraduate or graduate degree respectively.  Top 1, 5, 10, 25 and 50 indicate top 
schools at each level defined as the schools producing the most CEO's.  U, G and C indicate undergraduate, graduate and combined degrees 
respectively.   ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
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The coefficient on POWN is significant and negatively related to CEO total compensation. This finding is 
surprising as logic suggests that individuals owning larger portions of the firm would be able to secure higher 
salaries for themselves.  It may suggest a philanthropy element whereby individuals are willing to reduce the price 
of their services for a cause they care about.  Total assets are positively related to compensation as has been reported 
in Jalbert Rao and Jalbert, 2002.  The coefficients of about 0.030 indicate that for each $1,000 increase in assets 
managed, there is  a $30 increase in total compensation after controlling for other factors.  Interestingly, one year 
return is negatively related to CEO compensation, but three year returns are positively related to total compensation.  
This suggests that compensation and performance may misalign in the short term, but firms make adjustments to 
compensation packages to align performance and compensation in the longer term.  Free cash flow and ROA are 
both positively related to total compensation, again suggesting a positive relationship between total compensation 
and performance.  Industry, Payout Ratio, Sales Growth, Earnings Stability and Price to Book are not significantly 
related to total compensation.   
 
Table 7 shows the results for regressions on salary.  A quick examination indicates substantial differences 
between the total compensation and salary regressions.  First, in the top school regressions, TOP1 is significant and 
negative for undergraduate, graduate and combined regressions. This suggests that while graduates from Harvard are 
very successful in reaching top CEO positions, they are somewhat less effective at salary negotiations.  The results 
also show positive significance for the Top 10 combined schools. Years with the company is positive and 
significant.  Interestingly, FOUNDER is negative in the salary regressions.  This finding, combined with the 
findings from Table 6, suggest that founders have a lower salary but earn more from bonuses and stock gains than 
other CEOs.  Gender is marginally significant and positive in the undergraduate regressions indicating that women 
attract higher salaries than men.  Total assets is again strongly significant, but the coefficient size is much smaller 
and approaches zero.  Debt-to-assets are significant and positive, indicating that CEO's of more levered firms earn 
higher salaries.  Free cash flow is also positively and significantly related to salary levels.  In contrast to the total 
compensation regressions, one and three year returns are not significant in explaining salary.  It makes sense that 
salaries are not performance based, but other compensation components are. INDUSTRY, ROA, PAYOUT, 
SALESGR, EARNSTAB and PRtoBK are not significant in explaining salary. 
 
Table 8 Shows the results of regressions on salary plus bonus. The results show that CEOs who attended 
the Top5 or Top10 undergraduate schools earned higher salary plus bonus than other CEOs.  Those that earned their 
degree from a top 10 graduate school also earned significantly more than other CEOs.  Years as CEO is positively 
related to salary plus bonus, but YRSCO, FOUNDER, GENDER and POWN are not significantly related to salary 
plus bonus.  Total assets, debt to assets, three year return and ROA are each significantly positively related to salary 
plus bonus. 
 
The analysis turns to an examination of the extent that the educational background of the CEO predict the 
performance of the firm.  If CEOs from certain educational backgrounds produce superior returns, they should be 
sought after by the market and compensated appropriately.  To explore this issue, we regress the various education 
indicator variables on the three performance variables, ROA, ROE and ROI.  The first regression in Table 9 is 
specified as follows: 
 
                  (3) 
 
The results of regressions on ROA, ROE and ROI are presented in Panels A,B, and C respectively.  The 
results indicate that having earned an undergraduate degree is not significant in explaining ROA or ROI, but is 
positive and significant at the one percent level in explaining ROE.  Top10G, TOP25G and TOP50G, and TOP 25C 
are marginally significant in explaining ROA. In each of these cases, the coefficient is positive. No top school 
variables are significant in explaining ROE.  TOP5U, and TOP 10U are significant and positive in explaining ROI. 
TOP1G and TOP1C are negative and significant in explaining ROI.  This finding suggests that while Harvard 
University places many graduates in top CEO positions, Harvard graduates do not provide superior returns. 
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Table 6  Regressions on Total Compensation with Control Variables 
 UGATT GATT UNDERGRAD GRADUATE COMBINED 
Intercept -1,223,659 -1230191 -1225758 -1229914 -123993 
UGATT -1656.76 
-0.959 
    
GATT  -584.65 
-0.607 
   
CEOAGE 157.47 
1.959** 
160.21 
1.99** 
158.40 
1.97* 
159.01 
1.981** 
158.30 
1.97** 
YRS CEO 356.47 
4.29*** 
353.36 
4.26*** 
350.04 
4.21*** 
344.91 
4.156*** 
352.69 
4.24*** 
YRS CO -66.17 
-1.47 
-69.48 
-1.53 
-65.28 
-1.45 
-60.10 
-10.332 
-65.50 
-1.453 
FOUNDER 5564.80 
2.85*** 
5771.20 
2.97*** 
5842.15 
3.01*** 
5886.86 
3.04*** 
5835.37 
3.008*** 
GENDER -2988.06 
-0.719 
-3215.87 
-0.773 
-3151.20 
-0.757 
-2816.73 
-0.678 
-3047.90 
-0.734 
Percent Own -430.85*** -442.85 
-4.41*** 
-419.36 
-4.38*** 
-413.83 
-4.325*** 
-419.57 
-4.385*** 
Year 610.68 
3.62*** 
613.36 
3.64*** 
610.98 
3.628*** 
612.74 
3.640*** 
610.08 
3.621*** 
Industry 35.03 
0.942 
36.82 
0.989 
34.58 
0.930 
36.04 
0.97 
35.22 
0.948 
Total Assets 0.029 
5.97*** 
0.030 
5.993*** 
0.029 
5.96*** 
0.029 
5.82*** 
0.030 
5.98*** 
Debt to Assets 2.51 
0.101 
2.20 
0.089 
2.11 
0.085 
0.995 
0.04 
1.70 
0.069 
One Yr Return -14.51 
-2.46** 
-14.39 
-2.44** 
-14.48 
-2.456** 
-14.44 
-2.45** 
-14.47 
-2.45** 
Three Yr. Return 94.32 
5.73*** 
94.60 
5.751*** 
94.47 
5.744*** 
94.81 
5.766*** 
94.41 
5.737*** 
Free Cash Flow 0.274 
1.76* 
0.272 
1.74* 
0.272 
1.740* 
0.281 
1.797* 
0.273 
1.748* 
ROA 130.16 
2.09** 
129.71 
2.08** 
129.64 
2.08** 
126.90 
2.04** 
130.06 
2.087** 
Payout -0.128 
-0.178 
-0.118 
-0.165 
-0.132 
-0.184 
-0.14 
-0.195 
-0.130 
-0.182 
Sales Growth 27.19 
1.55 
26.76 
1.53 
27.02 
1.543 
27.53 
1.572 
27.06 
1.545 
Earnings Stability 134.63 
0.258 
152.08 
0.291 
143.20 
0.274 
104.32 
0.200 
137.78 
0.264 
Price to Book 0.428 
0.061 
0.258 
0.037 
0.22 
0.032 
0.304 
0.044 
0.296 
0.042 
N 3,167 3170 3170 3170 3170 
F-Statistic 9.58*** 9.86*** 9.841*** 9.97*** 9.83*** 
R2 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.056 
Adj. R2 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.050 
Top 1   1189.66 
0.418 
706.37 
0.446 
901.36 
0.617 
Top 5   1273.96 
0.846 
1169.69 
1.011 
314.90 
0.287 
Top 10   419.68 
0.341 
1673.95 
1.582 
-7.296 
-0.007 
Top 25   238.49 
0.235 
998.08 
1.03 
-238.73 
-0.256 
Top 50   -651.02 
-0.701 
944.19 
1.01 
1213.99 
1.286 
This table shows regressions on Total Compensation.  A degree or top school indicator is included in each regression, GATT, UGATT and Top1, 
Top5, Top 10, Top 25, and Top 50 as identified from Table 2.  In addition, a series of control variables are included in each regression.  The 
coefficients and significance of control variables are presented for the regressions on the Top 10, undergraduate graduate and combined 
regressions only.  The coefficients for the remaining top school indicators, without control variable statistics are also presented. 
***,** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
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Table 7  Regressions on Salary with Control Variables 
 UGATT GATT UNDERGRAD GRADUATE COMBINED 
Intercept -73239 -73455 -73297 -73396 -73764.7 
UGATT 17.86 
0.499 
    
GATT  -17.551 
-0.874 
   
CEOAGE 8.62 
5.193*** 
8.654 
5.217*** 
8.61 
5.193*** 
8.633 
5.209*** 
8.648 
5.219*** 
YRS CEO 3.711 
2.156** 
3.776 
2.197** 
3.705 
2.147** 
3.584 
2.082** 
3.450 
2.002** 
YRS CO 1.946 
2.077** 
1.824 
1.928* 
1.943 
2.075** 
2.046 
2.180** 
2.038 
2.175** 
FOUNDER -113.53 
-2.791*** 
-117.22 
-2.899*** 
-115.33 
-2.855*** 
-114.59 
-2.838*** 
-115.11 
-2.852*** 
GENDER 144.97 
1.688* 
140.73 
1.637 
143.95 
1.673* 
150.37 
1.751* 
140.33 
1.635 
Percent Own -9.6 
-5.074*** 
-9.811 
-5.203*** 
-9.686 
-5.149*** 
-9.552 
-5.075*** 
-9.588 
-5.099*** 
Year 36.76 
10.44*** 
36.877 
10.489*** 
36.79 
10.46*** 
36.835 
10.476*** 
37.02 
10.526*** 
Industry -3.92 
-5.05*** 
-3.869 
-4.977*** 
-3.927 
-5.057*** 
-3.901 
-5.032*** 
-3.892 
-5.022*** 
Total Assets 0.000 
4.571*** 
0.000 
4.590*** 
0.000 
4.551*** 
0.000 
4.413*** 
0.000 
4.502*** 
Debt to Assets 1.055 
2.038** 
1.084 
2.097** 
1.075 
2.078** 
1.054 
2.040** 
1.100 
2.129** 
One Yr Return -0.185 
-1.498 
-0.182 
-1.487 
-0.185 
-1.499 
-0.184 
-1.493 
-0.190 
-1.546 
Three Yr. Return -0.410 
-1.197 
-0.409 
-1.190 
-0.413 
-1.206 
-0.40 
-1.188 
-0.391 
-1.144 
Free Cash Flow 0.010 
2.992*** 
0.010 
2.988*** 
0.010 
2.987*** 
0.010 
3.039*** 
0.010 
2.985*** 
ROA 2.030 
1.619 
2.03 
1.620 
2.038 
1.626 
1.987 
1.586 
2.011 
1.605 
Payout -0.001 
-0.074 
0.000 
-0.46 
-0.001 
-0.072 
-0.001 
-0.084 
-0.001 
-0.085 
Sales Growth -0.469 
-1.281 
-0.477 
-1.302 
-0.468 
-1.280 
-0.458 
-1.251 
-0.468 
-1.280 
Earnings Stability -9.728 
-0.906 
-9.211 
-0.857 
-9.554 
-0.890 
-10.348 
-0.963 
-9.799 
-0.913 
Price to Book -0.108 
-0.739 
-0.108 
-0.741 
-0.108 
-0.742 
-0.107 
0.734 
-0.116 
-0.794 
N 3185 3188 3188 3188 3188 
F-Statistic 18.67*** 18.72*** 18.677*** 18.813*** 18.914*** 
R2 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.102 
Adj. R2 0.095 0.096 0.095 0.0969 0.096 
Top 1   -123.91 
-2.107** 
90.695 
2.742*** 
51.263 
1.681* 
Top 5   -9.919 
-0.316 
38.224 
1.581 
36.67 
1.603 
Top 10   6.617 
0.257 
34.157 
1.544 
42.343 
2.029** 
Top 25   -2.270 
-0.107 
0.962 
0.047 
-1.059 
-0.055 
Top 50   -15.631 
-0.807 
-2.541 
-0.130 
12.963 
0.658 
This table shows regressions on Salary.  A degree or top school indicator is included in each regression, GATT, UGATT and Top1, Top5, Top 
10, Top 25, and Top 50 as identified from Table 2.  In addition, a series of control variables are included in each regression.  The coefficients and 
significance of control variables are presented for the regressions on the Top 10, undergraduate graduate and combined regressions only.  The 
coefficients for the remaining top school indicators, without control variable statistics are also presented. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 
1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
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Table 8  Regressions on Salary plus Bonus with Control Variables 
 UGATT GATT UNDERGRAD GRADUATE COMBINED 
Intercept -860158 -867338 -871937 -870873 -873800 
UGATT 364.12 
0.695 
    
GATT  172.98 
0.589 
   
CEOAGE 81.56 
3.358*** 
82.425 
3.389*** 
83.201 
3.425*** 
83.26 
3.426*** 
83.245 
3.425*** 
YRS CEO 85.87 
3.414*** 
83.216 
3.307*** 
78.950 
3.126*** 
80.925 
3.212*** 
80.613 
3.193*** 
YRS CO -18.59 
-1.357 
-16.929 
-1.222 
-17.809 
-1.299 
-16.367 
-1.191 
-17.092 
-1.245 
FOUNDER -286.17 
-0.480 
-188.98 
-0.318 
-200.62 
-0.338 
-194.74 
-0.328 
-205.314 
-0.346 
GENDER -293.82 
-0.232 
-226.73 
-0.178 
-456.46 
-0.358 
-199.64 
-0.157 
-331.589 
-0.261 
Percent Own -74.92 
-2.709 
-72.36 
-2.620*** 
-73.06 
-2.653*** 
-71.42 
-2.591** 
-72.623 
-2.636*** 
Year 428.60 
8.343*** 
432.25 
8.400*** 
434.628 
8.454*** 
433.968 
8.441*** 
435.482 
8.465*** 
Industry -11.18 
-0.986 
-12.27 
-1.078 
-12.927 
-1.138 
-11.537 
-1.017 
-11.544 
-1.017 
Total Assets 0.009 
6.136*** 
0.009 
6.085*** 
0.009 
6.025*** 
0.009 
5.934*** 
0.009 
6.061*** 
Debt to Assets 16.04 
2.126** 
16.313 
2.160** 
17.141 
2.270** 
16.214 
2.149** 
16.762 
2.220** 
One Yr Return -1.575 
-0.876 
-1.601 
-0.888 
-1.610 
-0.895 
-1.570 
-0.872 
-1.638 
-0.909 
Three Yr. Return 14.163 
2.831*** 
14.210 
2.835*** 
14.353 
2.866*** 
14.385 
2.872*** 
14.491 
2.891*** 
Free Cash Flow -0.013 
-0.272 
-0.013 
-0.270 
0.016 
0.326 
-0.011 
0.227 
-0.014 
-0.283 
ROA 36.787 
2.009** 
37.767 
2.059** 
37.021 
2.019** 
36.718 
2.002** 
37.30 
2.034** 
Payout -0.042 
-0.193 
-0.048 
-0.221 
-0.048 
-0.128 
-0.048 
-0.218 
-0.047 
-0.214 
Sales Growth 4.567 
0.855 
4.509 
0.842 
4.378 
0.819 
4.591 
0.858 
4.424 
0.827 
Earnings Stability -27.128 
-0.173 
-24.995 
-0.159 
-12.375 
-0.079 
-32.793 
-0.209 
-22.844 
-0.145 
Price to Book -0.693 
-0.325 
-0.715 
-0.334 
-0.851 
-0.398 
-0.722 
-0.338 
-0.810 
-0.379 
N 3182 3185 3185 3185 3185 
F-Statistic 9.705 9.73*** 9.927*** 9.873*** 9.816*** 
R2 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.056 0.056 
Adj. R2 0.049 0.050 0.051 0.050 0.050 
Top 1   1115.03 
1.295 
764.00 
1.580 
870.42 
1.954* 
Top 5   1282.07 
2.759*** 
485.66 
1.373 
511.10 
1.528 
Top 10   740.166 
1.969** 
552.48 
1.708* 
419.42 
1.373 
Top 25   232.73 
0.752 
204.67 
0.691 
256.02 
0.900 
Top 50   64.784 
0.229 
336.56 
1.178 
220.27 
0.765 
This table shows regressions on Salary plus Bonus.  A degree or top school indicator is included in each regression, GATT, UGATT and Top1, 
Top5, Top 10, Top 25, and Top 50 as identified from Table 2.  In addition, a series of control variables are included in each regression.  The 
coefficients and significance of control variables are presented for the regressions on the Top 10, undergraduate graduate and combined 
regressions only.  The coefficients for the remaining top school indicators, without control variable statistics are also presented. ***,** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
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Table 9:  Regressions on Return Measures 
Panel A:  Return on Assets 
Independent Variable N Intercept Coefficient T-Statistic 
UGATT 5733 3.153 1.038 1.517 
GATT 5738 4.234 -0.230 -0.593 
Top 1U 5738 4.138 -1.220 -1.122 
Top 5U 5738 4.078 0.199 0.321 
Top 10U 5738 3.962 0.812 1.592 
Top 25U 5738 4.138 -0.127 -0.306 
Top 50U 5738 4.190 -0.197 -0.514 
Top 1G 5738 4.175 -0.814 1.234 
Top 5G 5738 4.003 0.515 1.053 
Top 10G 5738 3.900 0.786 1.792* 
Top 25G 5738 3.869 0.661 1.649* 
Top 50G 5738 3.780 0.739 1.917* 
Top 1C 5738 4.192 -0.825 -1.366 
Top 5C 5738 4.073 0.120 0.261 
Top 10C 5738 3.897 0.664 1.601 
Top 25C 5738 3.732 0.806 2.103** 
Top 50C 5738 3.763 0.568 1.460 
Panel B:  Return on Equity 
Independent Variable N Intercept Coef./Sig.  
UGATT 5570 -6.587 21.437 2.910*** 
GATT 5575 10.355 4.538 1.089 
Top 1U 5575 13.116 -3.076 -0.266 
Top 5U 5575 13.020 -0.029 -0.004 
Top 10U 5575 12.830 1.115 0.203 
Top 25U 5575 13.065 -0.161 -0.036 
Top 50U 5575 11.939 2.345 0.569 
Top 1G 5575 13.052 -0.386 -0.054 
Top 5G 5575 12.896 0.645 0.123 
Top 10G 5575 11.935 4.239 0.900 
Top 25G 5575 11.658 3.875 0.901 
Top 50G 5575 11.217 4.150 1.002 
Top 1C 5575 13.102 -0.764 -0.117 
Top 5C 5575 12.932 0.377 0.076 
Top 10C 5575 12.024 3.250 0.729 
Top 25C 5575 11.513 3.295 0.799 
Top 50C 5575 10.528 4.200 1.005 
Panel C:  Return on Investment 
Independent Variable N Intercept Coef./Sig.  
UGATT 5672 6.509 2.052 1.243 
GATT 5677 8.770 -0.664 -0.709 
Top 1U 5677 8.402 -0.680 -0.256 
Top 5U 5677 8.097 2.702 1.797* 
Top 10U 5677 7.923 2.732 2.214** 
Top 25U 5677 8.648 -0.878 -0.877 
Top 50U 5677 8.342 0.120 0.129 
Top 1G 5677 8.779 -4.329 -2.718*** 
Top 5G 5677 8.676 -1.587 -1.336 
Top 10G 5677 8.545 -0.288 -0.272 
Top 25G 5677 8.412 -0.089 -0.092 
Top 50G 5677 8.325 0.128 0.138 
Top 1C 5677 8.779 -3.578 -2.443** 
Top 5C 5677 8.704 -1.448 -1.308 
Top 10C 5677 8.487 -0.348 -0.348 
Top 25C 5677 8.341 0.087 0.094 
Top 50C 5677 8.451 -0.119 -0.127 
This table shows the results of ordinary least squares  regressions on three measures of return. Panel A reports the results of regressions on Return 
on Assets.  Panel B reports the results or regressions on Return on Equity.  Panel C reports the results of regressions on Return on Investment. 
UGATT and GATT are dummy variables indicating if the CEO has an undergraduate or graduate degree respectively.  Top 1, 5, 10, 25 and 50 
indicate top schools at each level defined as the schools producing the most CEO's.  U, G and C indicate undergraduate, graduate and combined 
degrees respectively.   ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
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Next, a series of control variables are included in each of the performance regressions.  The analysis 
regresses one educational variable, and a series of control variables on one of the three performance measures.  The 
regression presented in the first column of Table 10 is specified as follows: 
 
                                                                  
                                                     
                                                              
           
  (4)    
 
Tables 10 and 11 present results for regressions on ROA and ROI respectively.  Regressions on ROE are 
not presented because of limited evidence of significance in the regressions in Table 9.  In the same manner as 
Tables 6-8, columns in the tables present the results when various educational variables are substituted into Equation 
4. The first two columns include the degree earned variables UGATT and GATT.  Columns three through five 
provide an analysis for top undergraduate, graduate and combined schools respectively.  The control variable 
estimates are presented only for the TOP 10 education variable to conserve space.  Coefficients for the education 
variables obtained from separate regressions are presented at the bottom of the table. 
 
The results of regressions on ROA are presented in Table 10.  The results show that UGATT and GATT 
are not significant in explaining ROA.  Top25U is negative and marginally significant and Top10G is positive and 
marginally significant in explaining ROA. CEO age is positively related to ROA, however; the number of years as 
CEO is negatively related to ROA.  This finding is consistent with arguments that seasoned CEOs are less 
aggressive than new CEOs, taking less risks and earning lower returns.  POWN is positively related to ROA, 
suggesting that higher levels of ownership motivate managers to perform better.  Total assets are negatively related 
to ROA.  This size effect confirms the findings of many other studies that find small firms perform better than large 
firms.  One-year return is not significant in explaining ROA, but three year returns has positive explanatory power 
over ROA.  Both risk measures, Earnings Stability and Price-to-Book are significant in explaining ROA.  
FOUNDER is not significant in explaining ROA.  This finding is a reversal of Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002) who 
found that founders earn higher returns than non founders.   GENDER, Free cash flow, dividend payouts, and sales 
growth are not significant in explaining ROA. 
 
Table 11 presents results of regressions on Return on Investment (ROI).  The most striking finding from 
this table is that the top graduate and combined university (Harvard) is significantly negative in explaining ROI.  
The results are significant at the one percent level.  The results also indicate that top 25 and top 50 undergraduate 
school graduates produce lower ROI than other schools.  Interestingly, in contrast to the ROA regressions, total 
assets are not significant in explaining Return on Investment.   
 
SECTION 6:  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This paper examines compensation and performance of CEOs from the largest U.S. firms.  Data from the 
Forbes Magazine Compensation list was merged with Compustat data for the time period of 1997-2006.  This paper 
is an extension of Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002).  Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert examined data from 1987-1996, so this 
paper represents ten year forward move in time.   
 
Universities are ranked based on the number of CEOs they place in top CEO positions.  Rankings are 
provided for undergraduate, graduate and combined degrees.  The results show that over the past ten years, Harvard 
University has taken over the number one undergraduate provider spot.   
 
Harvard is now the leader in all three categories, undergraduate, graduate and combined degrees.  Harvard 
accounts for 11.5 percent of all CEO's and 12.5 of CEOs that have a degree.  The top fifty schools provide an 
education to some 73.3 percent of all CEOs.  Universities are also ranked based on the total compensation their 
graduates earn as a CEO.  The results show significant disparity between the number of graduates placed as a CEO 
and the compensation earned as CEO.  Graduates from City University New York Queens and City University New 
York City earn the highest total compensation as CEO.  
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Table 10  Regressions on Return on Assets with Control Variables 
 UGATT GATT UNDERGRAD GRADUATE COMBINED 
Intercept -358.69 -361.897 -360.95 -361.15 -362.338 
UGATT 0.239 
0.469 
    
GATT  -0.181 
-0.635 
   
CEOAGE 0.060 
2.561** 
0.061 
2.580** 
0.061 
2.571** 
0.061 
2.582** 
0.061 
2.571** 
YRS CEO -0.085 
-3.489*** 
-0.085 
-3.476*** 
-0.087 
-3.536*** 
-0.088 
-3.568*** 
-0.087 
-3.545*** 
YRS CO -0.002 
-0.120 
-0.003 
-0.206 
-0.002 
-0.113 
0.000 
0.002 
-0.001 
-0.077 
FOUNDER 0.811 
1.40 
0.777 
1.349 
0.800 
1.390 
0.812 
1.411 
0.799 
1.388 
GENDER 1.872 
1.547 
1.830 
1.510 
1.824 
1.506 
1.955 
1.617 
1.852 
1.531 
Percent Own 0.071 
2.650*** 
0.069 
2.580** 
0.070 
2.637*** 
0.072 
2.704*** 
0.070 
2.649*** 
Year 0.176 
3.531*** 
0.178 
3.569*** 
0.178 
3.560*** 
0.178 
3.561*** 
0.179 
3.575*** 
Industry -0.059 
-5.356*** 
-0.059 
-5.307*** 
-0.059 
-5.394*** 
-0.059 
-5.342*** 
-0.059 
-5.355*** 
Total Assets 0.000 
-3.384*** 
0.000 
-3.373*** 
0.000 
-3.419*** 
0.000 
-3.529*** 
0.000 
-3.418*** 
Debt to Assets -0.163 
-24.22*** 
-0.163 
-24.192*** 
-0.163 
-24.157*** 
-0.163 
-24.260*** 
-0.163 
-24.192*** 
One Yr Return 0.000 
-0.444 
0.000 
-0.428 
0.000 
-0.449 
0.000 
-0.439 
0.000 
-0.462 
Three Yr. Return 0.050 
10.554*** 
0.050 
10.567*** 
0.050 
10.558*** 
0.051 
10.575*** 
0.051 
10.577*** 
Free Cash Flow 0.000 
0.468 
0.000 
0.464 
0.000 
0.451 
0.000 
0.516 
0.000 
0.464 
Payout 0.000 
-0.648 
0.000 
-0.629 
0.000 
-0.652 
0.000 
-0.6610 
0.000 
-0.653 
Sales Growth 0.002 
0.495 
0.002 
0.483 
0.002 
0.497 
0.002 
0.505 
0.002 
0.501 
Earnings Stability 2.577 
17.707*** 
2.584 
17.747*** 
2.582 
17.748*** 
2.565 
17.611*** 
2.578 
17.723*** 
Price to Book 0.006 
3.101*** 
0.006 
3.101*** 
0.006 
3.086*** 
0.006 
3.102*** 
0.006 
3.081*** 
N 3196 3199 3199 3199 3199 
F-Statistic 83.73*** 83.89*** 83.985*** 84.094*** 83.91*** 
R2 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.322 0.322 
Adj. R2 0.318 0.318 0.318 0.319 0.318 
Top 1   -1.044 
-1.245 
-0.408 
-0.865 
-0.582 
-1.339 
Top 5   -0.432 
-1.191 
0.040 
0.117 
-0.272 
-0.836 
Top 10   0.246 
0.673 
0.535 
1.701* 
0.245 
0.410 
Top 25   -0.587 
-1.951* 
0.122 
0.423 
0.395 
1.429 
Top 50   -0.439 
-1.595 
0.138 
0.495 
0.068 
0.244 
This table shows regressions on Return on Assets.  A degree or top school indicator is included in each regression, GATT, UGATT and Top1, 
Top5, Top 10, Top 25, and Top 50 as identified from Table 2.  In addition, a series of control variables are included in each regression.  The 
coefficients and significance of control variables are presented for the regressions on the Top 10, undergraduate graduate and combined 
regressions only.  The coefficients for the remaining top school indicators, without control variable statistics are also presented. ***,** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2011 Volume 27, Number 1 
35 
Table 11  Regressions on Return on Investment with Control Variables 
 UGATT GATT UNDERGRAD GRADUATE COMBINED 
Intercept 878.79 -886.976  -874.795 -871.07 
UGATT -0.060 
-0.036 
    
GATT  -0.937 
-0.991 
   
CEOAGE 0.130 
1.663* 
0.132 
1.689* 
0.131 
1.676* 
0.129 
1.652* 
0.129 
1.654* 
YRS CEO -0.303 
-3.731*** 
-0.300 
-3.707*** 
-0.309 
-3.808*** 
-0.298 
-3.679*** 
-0.298 
3.672*** 
YRS CO -0.014 
-0.308 
-0.020 
-0.458 
-0.014 
-0.316 
-0.016 
-0.367 
-0.015 
-0.347 
FOUNDER 3.138 
1.635 
3.023 
1.585 
3.139 
1.647* 
3.101 
1.627 
3.117 
1.635 
GENDER -3.032 
-0.758 
-3.299 
-0.823 
-3.329 
-0.830 
-3.130 
-0.782 
-2.983 
-0.745 
Percent Own 0.356 
4.022*** 
0.350 
3.963*** 
0.357 
4.050*** 
0.353 
4.010*** 
0.355 
4.030*** 
Year 0.433*** 
2.611 
0.437 
2.640*** 
0.434 
2.624*** 
0.431 
2.603*** 
0.429 
2.590** 
Industry -0.106 
-2.889 
-0.103 
-2.806*** 
-0.107 
-2.933*** 
-0.105 
-2.892*** 
-0.105 
-2.889*** 
Total Assets 0.000 
-0.449 
0.000 
-0.417 
0.000 
-0.491 
0.000 
-0.394 
0.000 
-0.434 
Debt to Assets -0.262 
-10.463*** 
-0.261 
-10.437*** 
-0.260 
-10.401*** 
-0.262 
-10.466*** 
-0.262 
-10.488*** 
One Yr Return -0.001 
-0.231 
-0.001 
-0.211 
-0.001 
-0.242 
-0.001 
-0.238 
-0.001 
-0.222 
Three Yr. Return 0.138 
8.578*** 
0.138 
8.599*** 
0.137 
8.582*** 
0.137 
8.581*** 
0.137 
8.569*** 
Free Cash Flow 0.000 
0.802 
0.000 
0.793 
0.000 
0.733 
0.000 
0.785 
0.000 
0.804 
Payout 0.000 
-0.475 
0.000 
-0.444 
0.000 
-0.479 
0.000 
-0.467 
0.000 
-0.468 
Sales Growth -0.022 
-1.395 
-0.022 
1.412 
-0.022 
-1.392 
-0.022 
-1.397 
-0.022 
-1.396 
Earnings Stability 6.194 
12.791*** 
6.219 
12.837*** 
6.206 
12.824*** 
6.213 
12.817*** 
6.198 
12.808*** 
Price to Book 0.015 
2.111** 
0.014 
2.106** 
0.014 
2.082** 
0.015 
2.115** 
0.015 
2.126** 
N 3186 3189 3189 3189 3189 
F-Statistic 28.24 28.34*** 28.346 28.299*** 28.289*** 
R2 0.138 0.139 0.139 0.138 0.138 
Adj. R2 0.133 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.133 
Top 1   -1.722 
-0.620 
-4.259 
-2.724*** 
-4.040 
-2.809*** 
Top 5   1.251 
0.845 
-1.755 
-1.537 
-1.392 
-1.291 
Top 10   1.283 
1.058 
-0.655 
-0.628 
-0.476 
-0.483 
Top 25   -2.177 
-2.183** 
-1.059 
0.267 
-0.504 
-0.550 
Top 50   -1.762 
-1.929* 
-0.122 
-0.784 
-1.272 
-1.372 
This table shows regressions on Return on Investment.  A degree or top school indicator is included in each regression, GATT, UGATT and 
Top1, Top5, Top 10, Top 25, and Top 50 as identified from Table 2.  In addition, a series of control variables are included in each regression.  
The coefficients and significance of control variables are presented for the regressions on the Top 10, undergraduate graduate and combined 
regressions only.  The coefficients for the remaining top school indicators, without control variable statistics are also presented. ***,** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
 
 
Regressions on compensation and performance variables were completed.  Evidence from these regressions 
was mixed concerning the impact of educational background on CEO compensation as well as on CEO 
performance.  Perhaps the most interesting finding in the study is that while Harvard University places many 
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graduates in CEO positions, by some measures, Harvard graduates produce lower returns for their investors. 
 
While many findings in this paper are consistent with those of Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002) there are 
several notable exceptions.  University rankings show significant changes over the past ten years.  For example, 
University of Wisconsin improved from 13th to 4th place in placing CEOs over the past ten years.  Compensation 
rankings also show significant differences.  For example, Long Island University while unranked in Jalbert, Rao and 
Jalbert, 2002, ranks 5th in the current study.  Dickinson and Fairleigh Dickinson, while previously ranked very high, 
dropped out of the rankings in this study.  While elements of total compensation compression, whereby CEOs that 
have been with the company longer earn less, were evident in the earlier study, no relationship is identified here.  
When examining the salary measure of compensation, years with the company is positive and significant in this 
study. 
 
A great deal of research remains to be done on the role that education plays on compensation and 
performance of CEOs.  This study does not address how the specific degree earned impacts compensation and 
performance. If CEOs with different degrees perform differently, and the mix of degrees offered by universities 
differs, the results of this study could be biased.  In addition, schools are ranked here based on popularity.  Further 
insights might be gained by examining other measures of University quality such as average SAT or GMAT scores. 
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